Conventional wisdom is that trade policy is often guided by geopolitical security considerations. A growing body of research addresses the security-trade linkage as a plausible cause for executive negotiations over the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) in 2007. Yet, the approval of a trade deal with the Asian ally by America's legislature in 2011 features not only 'security ties' but also 'electoral connections'. This paper seeks to examine the question of whether alliance relationships would inevitably translate into domestic commitments. Bringing domestic politics into consideration, this article also fills the gap in the literature on Congress-focused research of the KORUS FTA and sheds light on how lawmakers strike a balance between the principle of US foreign policy and the reality of conflicting domestic interests. 
Introduction
In 2007, South Korea and the United States signed the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) to further solidify economic cooperation and trade relation between the two military partners. The Democraticcontrolled US Congress, however, forced the George W. Bush administration to back out for the time being over the treatment of autos and beef. 1 Yet quite interestingly, among these four Korean War veterans, two of them -Conyers from Michigan and Coble from North Carolina -voted against the KORUS FTA. Then puzzling is why some US lawmakers chose to defend and others deny a free trade deal with the 11th largest economy and a key military ally in East Asia.
An increasing number of foreign policy scholars are examining the trade agreements between the United States and Korea as security partners across the Pacific (Lim, 2006; Heo, 2008; Koo, 2010; Sohn and Koo, 2011; Robertson, 2012; Koo and Jho, 2013) . Focusing on trade negotiations between these partners, they address the construct of the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement from the perspective of 'trading for security ' (Higgot, 2004; Long and Leeds, 2006) . The main argument is that policymakers on the American side initiated and facilitated a trade deal with South Korea as a crucial military ally so that the economy-security linkage did play a key role in pressing the trade deal. It is true that the Obama administration praised the KORUS FTA as Washington's first bilateral trade agreement with a major Asian economy and security partner.
Yet, a closer look at the roll-call votes in the US Congress presents a slightly different story. To be more precise, the passage of the trade deal with Korea in America's legislature features the dimensions of not only 'security ties' but also 'electoral connections' and 'party politics'. This paper seeks not to refute the significance of the security-trade linkage in the approval of the KORUS FTA but to revisit the question of whether alliance relationships in a geopolitical context would easily translate into domestic commitments in a representative democracy. In the process of endorsing executive negotiations for international agreements, how would the legislative branch and party politics respond? Why did some members of the US Congress ratify and others reject the free trade agreement with South Korea, as the total of 535 lawmakers from the House and Senate represent a diverse set of electoral dynamics and partisan considerations?
Few studies have investigated whether US lawmakers would securitize trade commitments or the logic of Innenpolitik would prevail over the American grand strategy. Filling this gap in the literature on Congressfocused research of the KORUS FTA, this paper investigates whether and how the imperative of the 'securitization of trade' would actually influence congressional behavior and partisan considerations. My main finding about the domestic politics of the KORUS FTA approval is that not only the nexus of 'security-trade' but also the 'inside-the-belt-way' politics including the influences of constituency and partisanship matter in trade deals. US lawmakers care about electoral connections with district voters as well as security ties with foreign allies. This research sheds light on how lawmakers strike a balance between military alliances and electoral considerations, when the principle of US foreign policy comes face to face with the reality of domestic and partisan interests.
The article proceeds as follows. The first section briefly overviews the literature on the linkage between security and trade in the context of domestic and congressional politics. Then, I offer information on how members and leaders of the US Congress addressed the KORUS FTA, particularly when beef and automobile negotiations put the trade deal in trouble. The third section explores how domestic interests, ideology, and institutions in the US shaped congressional choices over the trade deal with Korea and then presents a logistic regression analysis to test what determines roll-call voting on the KORUS FTA in the US House and Senate. I conclude this paper with further research agendas to illuminate on how the interaction between domestic politics and international relations evolve in the area of a trade-security nexus in East Asia.
'Securitizing trade': international relations and domestic politics
The prospect that 'trade brings security' has been an enduring theme for scholars of international relations (Bliss and Russett, 1998 Mansfield, 1993; Gowa, 1994; Long and Leeds, 2006) . During the Cold War, the 'trade-security' nexus was a compelling logic in the making of US foreign policy. Also, in the post-9/11 era, the war against terrorism has further strengthened the linkage between military alliances and economic cooperations. Indeed, a host of studies have paid attention to the security-trade linkage as a plausible explanation for recent trade deals. More specifically, scholars of international security suggest that security partners tend to trade more than non-partners due to a concern over 'security externalities'. This concept focuses on gains from trade, which could potentially empower nonmilitary allies. Exploring the relationship between international power politics and international open markets, Gowa (1994, 6) claims that 'the real-income gains that motivate free trade are also the source of security externalities that can either impede or facilitate trade: Trade with an adversary produces a security diseconomy; trade with an ally produces a positive externality'. As a result, security allies are likely to value trade relations as an effort to strengthen their defense partnership. A substantial body of research suggests that the concept of 'trade following the flag' constructs and constrains state behavior in international politics.
Yet, while trade agreements are often guided by geopolitical security considerations, it is not clear whether domestic interests and national institutions would simply give the green light to free trade with military allies. As a matter of fact, ever since the notion of the 'second image reversed' by Gourevitch (1978) and the 'two-level games' by Putnam (1988) Milner (1996) , for instance, address the impacts of internationalization on domestic politics, with a focus on the distinction between winners and losers from internationalization. They claim that demands and changes in international relations tend to reshape domestic interests and conflicts that in turn should entail modified mobilization and coalition transformations.
According to Fearon (1998, 303) , 'a large body of work explores domesticpolitical sources of protectionism in trade policy that is suboptimal for voters/consumers'. Due to democratic and representative systems of foreign policymaking, Fearon suggests that states might end up choosing a suboptimal trade policy that has little to do with geopolitical security strategies. When it comes to the divide in international relations studies, Chorev (2007) elaborates on the regime shifts in American protectionism over time through the relative 'weight' of explanatory power between domestic and international factors. In short, Milner (1998, 759) points out that 'IR theorists must bring a systematic analysis of domestic politics into the field' to better understand peace and prosperity.
More specifically, a growing body of research explores a diverse dimension of the trade agreements between the United States and South Korea. To begin with, Lim (2006) points to the uncharacteristic push of the KORUS by the leftist Roh Moo-Hyun government in South Korea. As President Roh had been friendly toward labor unions and hostile against US foreign policy, the trade deal was considered quite puzzling not only to his supporters but also to conservative opponents. Some scholars argue that the new political and security environments brought to the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Cold War offer the answer. For instance, in response to Lim's (2006) mystery, Heo (2008) emphasizes the role of trade agreements in strengthening security ties between the United States and South Korea. Despite the rise of anti-American sentiment in Korea, according to Heo, the Roh administration realized that the signing of the KORUS FTA would restore the US-Korea alliance relationship and restrict the threats from a nuclear North Korea.
Other scholars have examined the negotiation processes between the military partners across the Pacific Ocean. Koo (2010) and Sohn and Koo (2011) , with a focus on the changing imperatives of security-trade linkage from the Cold War to the post-Cold War to the 9/11 periods, confirm that the delayed approval of the KORUS FTA is an evidence of the difficulty facing the United States in fully revitalizing the logic of securitizing trade even in the post-9/11 era. Koo and Jho (2013) also point out that institutional bases and ideological beliefs shape and reshape the perceptions and strategies of trade negotiators in both countries. On the contrary, Robertson (2012) argues that due to the specific characteristics of the Korea-US trade deals, South Korea's national style in negotiation turns out to be not as significant as in other negotiation processes.
What is largely understudied in the literature on the KORUS FTA in particular as well as the trade-security nexus in general is about the scope and significance of domestic components in international agreements. It is also interesting to see the divergent voting rationale articulated by a group of like-minded foreign policy hawks on Capitol Hill. For instance, Rep. Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), an outspoken critic of North Korea and the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, delivered a floor speech to Hunter (R-CA), another leading hawk in the Republican House, disagreed and claimed that 'perhaps most troubling about KORUS FTA is the unintended economic boost it will give to China, currently South Korea's largest trading partner' (Congressional Record, E1834, 12 October 2011). Accordingly, with respect to the linkage between security and trade, an upfront test would be to systematically examine whether foreign policy conservatives are more likely to support trade agreements with security allies than others. 6 The National Journal, a nonpartisan publication covering American politics, offers a measure of foreign policy conservatism based upon key roll-call votes cast by members of the US Congress in the previous year. Ranging from 0 to 100, higher scores denote more internationalist and assertive stances in foreign policy votes. 7 Table 2 5 As a matter of fact, the floor speech delivered by Rep. Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) clearly signified the reasoning of trade-security nexus. 'There is more at stake than just increased exports … At a time when much of the world is waiting to see if the US will retreat from its responsibilities, passage of this free trade agreement will serve as a clear demonstration of our enduring commitment to our ally South Korea and our determination to defend our interests throughout East Asia.' (Congressional Record E1831, 12 October 2011).
6 For an excellent analysis of the US foreign policy ideology, see Narizni (2003 Also, in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Republican members strongly backed the KORUS FTA (76%), compared to Democrats (32%). A simple chi-square analysis confirms that Republican members clearly endorse the KORUS FTA vis-à-vis Democrats, irrespective of the fact that both party members sit on the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees. 9 Contrary to the expectation that transnational and defense committee members would collectively support free trade with Korea, partisan politics turns out to be a crucial factor in governing vote choices by lawmakers. In the end, multivariate analyses are warranted to comprehensively examine whether the security-economic nexus has prevailed in congressional approval of the KORUS FTA, controlling for a variety of vote determinants ranging from partisanship to ideology to constituency.
The KORUS FTA and the 112th US Congress (2011-12): an empirical analysis
To understand the whole process of free trade agreements moving forward for approval, it is critical to examine how members of US Congress respond. Ultimately, it is the US Congress on the American side that has the final say about the destiny of any free trade agreement with foreign countries. This section examines whether and which members of US Congress actually follow the logic of the trade-security nexus by testing altogether the influence of constituency, ideology, party, and members' own characteristics. As previous research has paid scant attention to domestic sources of trade agreements with security allies, this paper shifts the focus onto domestic and congressional politics of free trade deals with Korea, a fast-growing economic powerhouse in East Asia. Examining how congressional members behave in the context of domestic and electoral politics, Mayhew (1974) famously observes that lawmakers are 'single-minded seekers of re-election' so that credible voting records representing constituency preferences are vital for their re-election efforts. Also, lawmakers as party members often seek to maximize electoral benefits from their party reputation. In the end, while a legislator's voting record is a 'personal' position, a party's policy stance is a form of 'collective' position (Key, 1955; Burnham, 1970 Mayhew (1974, 61) concludes that congressional behavior has a great deal to do with position taking, which is 'the public enunciation of a judgmental statement on anything likely to be of interest to political actors … and the statement may take the form of a roll call vote'. In sum, positions taken by members of the US Congress stem from individual as well as collective deliberations in legislative decisions over international commitments and alliances.
Ultimately, then, what made some lawmakers endorse the KORUS FTA Implementation bill early on and other members seek to deny the crucial Asian security ally a free trade deal? Among the normal voting determinants, such as constituency interests, members' characteristics including ideology, and partisan strategies, what would stand out as a key driving force for the passage of the KORUS FTA? The question is why it seems quite complicated for the free trade deal between the security allies to be approved and implemented, despite the fact that next to NAFTA, the KORUS FTA is the second largest free trade agreement for the United States and that South Korea is America's seventh largest trading partner and a critical security partner in the Asia-Pacific region. The dependent variable is vote choices made by congressional members and coded 1 for yea and 0 for otherwise. Using logistic regression methods of the roll-call vote records in both the House and Senate, I test the influences of the constituency, members' characteristics and preferences, along with political parties.
First of all, when it comes to the constituency inputs, I have included the percentage of Obama's vote share in the 2008 presidential election to measure any negative influence of the constituents' liberal ideology against free trade deals (Jackson and Engel, 2003; Biglaiser et al., 2004) . With respect to any positive impacts of economic interests on lawmakers' vote choices, the portions of service sector, rural population, and states' export to South Korea (not available for the House analysis) are incorporated into the models (Schiller, 1999) . Moreover, I use the percentage of college graduates as the measurement to test the hypothesis regarding lawmakers from capital-abundant districts and states to be more supportive of the KORUS FTA. As Scheve and Slaughter (2001) indicate, a high level of college graduates creates capital-abundant districts and states, which tend to prefer trade liberalization. And, the Korean population percentage is also included to check any ethnic influence on lawmakers' trade preferences.
In addition, congressional members' own characteristics often matter in terms of trade policy preferences and voting decisions (Shepsle, 1992; Burden, 2007) . Lawmakers with legislative seniority and electoral security are hypothesized to endorse free trade. And, National Journal's foreign policy conservatism ratings are introduced as the main proxy for the trade-security nexus. Basically, I argue that members with hawkish foreign policy positions are more likely to value trade relations with security allies than other lawmakers. In the meantime, I repeat the logistic regression analyses through three different models to find out whether the KORUS FTA votes are truly motivated by security concerns regardless of overall ideological standings (Poole and Rosenthal's DW-Nominate Scores) or united partisan positions.
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Tables 3 and 4 report the results from the multivariate logistic regression analyses of the House and Senate voting on the KORUS FTA, respectively. First, National Journal foreign policy conservatism variables, a proxy measure of the security-trade nexus, well explain congressional members' voting on the KORUS FTA in both chambers. In the House Model (I) case, the predicted probability of a member scoring 91 on foreign policy conservatism voting for the KORUS FTA would be 90% higher than a member with a score of 0, whereas the Senate Model (I) shows 41% difference between the highest and lowest scoring senators.
Also in the case of the lower chamber, the influence of foreign policy conservatism is still relevant even after the consideration of members' overall ideology and party membership, as reported in the Model (II) and (III). This finding in particular confirms that security concerns do matter for House members' voting decisions on free trade with the security ally in East Asia. The Senate, however, shows the loss of explanatory power of foreign policy conservatism, as the other models include ideology and party. And yet, the main inquiry in this paper is to see whether not only the logic of 'securitizing trade' but also domestic, electoral, and partisan interests play a critical role in determining congressional behavior toward trade agreements with foreign allies. Do US lawmakers care less about electoral connections with domestic voters than security ties with foreign allies? Through the case study of the KORUS FTA passage in the US Congress, the empirical findings confirm that constituency considerations, electoral expediency, and partisan positions also have statistically significant influences. First of all, the percentage of Korean population in their districts heavily affects House members' voting decisions related to the trade deal with Korea. In 2011, the minimum and maximum values for the percentage of Korean immigrants in congressional districts were 0 and 6.59 (New York's 5th district). 11 Additionally, the predicted probability of a House member with 6.59% of Korean population voting for the KORUS FTA is ∼28-30% higher than a member with 0% Korean residents. On the contrary, the Korean population in states does not necessarily translate into senators' decisions on the free trade deal with South Korea. The portion of college graduates is another constituency factor that led members in the lower chamber to strongly support the KORUS FTA. In addition to the factor endowment perspective offered by Scheve and Slaughter (2001) , Broz (2005) also suggests that voters with a higher education are fully aware and consistently supportive of the need for international financial rescues in the wake of economic crises in Mexico and East Asia. In the House, congressional members from the districts with a high portion of college graduates tended to approve the KORUS FTA. The predicted probability of a representative with college graduates constituting 67% of the total population voting for the KORUS FTA is ∼57-61% higher than a representative with 0% college graduates.
Party membership was critical in the House. The Republican Party in control of the lower chamber was overwhelmingly in favor of the KORUS FTA, and their support was statistically significant. To be more precise, partisan breakdown in terms of the KORUS FTA passage is as follows: 219 yeas and 21 nays by GOP, compared to 59 yeas and 130 nays by the House Democrats. In the Senate, all 15 nay votes came from the Democratic Party, except for Olympia Snowe, the retiring Maine Republican. Yet, statistically speaking, party label does not provide any significant explanatory power in terms of vote choices on the KORUS FTA, as the upper chamber overwhelmingly supports trade liberalization (Karol, 2007) .
In sum, not only security concerns but also domestic interests influence the way members of the US Congress vote free trade deals with Korea as security partner. Two main findings stand out from the empirical analyses of congressional voting on the KORUS FTA. First, foreign policy conservatism as a measurement of trade-security nexus figures prominently in both chambers. Particularly, in the House side, neither overall ideological position nor party membership drowns out lawmakers' security motivations in terms of trade voting. Second, the influence of constituency signifies the House voting on the KORUS FTA. Lawmakers from the districts with a significant number of college graduates or Korean immigrants tend to be highly supportive of free trade with South Korea.
Conclusion
Trade policy is guided by geopolitical calculations, with economy and security being intimately linked. Thus, a growing number of scholars address the linkage between security and trade as the basis of the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). The Office of the United States Trade Representative also suggests that 'as the first US FTA with a North Asian partner, the KORUS FTA is a model for trade agreements for the rest of the region, and underscores the U.S. commitment to, and engagement in, the Asia-Pacific region'. 12 In addition, recent studies have begun to address US trade policy as a tool of containing China in the Asia-Pacific region. In his recent analyses of 'a contest for supremacy' between the United States and China, Friedberg (2011) claims that instead of a 'Cold-War' type military alliance and presence, American policymakers have become increasingly interested in forming free trade agreements (FTAs) to effectively slow down the economic influence of Beijing. Then, the question is how American lawmakers in the context of domestic politics understand and approach the balance between geopolitical demands and electoral politics. This paper has explored the dynamics of congressional politics over the course of approving free trade deals with a security ally and analyzed how and why the controversial trade agreement could survive in American politics, now highly divided over the future course of American foreign policy. Empirical findings show that not only the 'security-trade' nexus but also the influences of constituency and partisanship matter in the approval of the KORUS FTA. Despite the fanfare over the trade agreement with the world's 11th largest economy, a closer look at the roll-call votes by members of the US Congress reveals another politics as usual.
In sum, this paper illuminates how lawmakers in the context of domestic politics approach international agreements by striking a balance between security ties and electoral connections. As the debate over trade with Korea overlapped with an era of partisan gridlock and a polarized Congress, the KORUS FTA continued to be another partisan football (Theriault, 2008) . Then, in the wake of America's financial crisis in 2008 and recent North Korean provocations, the Obama administration wielded its political muscle to push through the trade deal. The Korea trade deal seems to have provided rare bipartisan cooperation between the Republican House and the Democratic President. The analyses of congressional voting decisions contribute to a better understanding of American foreign policymaking in the context of domestic and electoral politics, wherein the political center is arguably disappearing and extreme ideologies are dominant.
Future research is warranted to move from just one country case study to more comprehensive analyses of trade-security nexus in international relations. To better understand the conflicting or compensating influences of security and domestic motivations, it would be great to expand the list of countries with which the United States maintain security alliances as well as trade relations. With a focus on the countries such as New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan, the research would keep pressing the question of whether policymakers and representatives weigh their security and economic interests differently when voting on FTAs with allies rather than non-allies. In short, further comparative analyses of the trade-security nexus not only in global setting but also in domestic context should advance our understanding of how trade and security interact with each other in the era of securitizing trade.
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